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THE MYTH OF LEGAL REASONING*
ALAN D. HORNSTEIN**
It has become a bromide of contemporary legal educators that one of
the most significant goals of the American law school is to teach the
student how to think "like a lawyer." The (not very well-hidden)
assumption is that lawyers think differently from, perhaps better than,
non-lawyers and that the neophyte law student must learn this new
reasoning process before he can become a competent lawyer. Yet, it is
rare to find a specific course in which this special skill is given explicit
recognition. The closest that legal instruction comes to explaining to the
student the rules of legal thinking is found in orientation programs or
legal method lectures in which the importance of skills such as finding the
issues, becoming aware of procedural contexts, sifting out important
facts, and spotting court holdings is discussed.
It is rare, however, that there is any meaningful or systematic
explanation of how these skills are to be learned or why they are
important to the competent practice of law. Nowhere in the typical law
school curriculum are principles of "legal reasoning" taught as a
separate discipline in the way that principles of substantive law are
taught. Indeed, many legal educators believe that it is impossible to
identify the principles underlying the process of legal reasoning and to
* A few words may be in order with respect to the purport of what follows. Any
value to be found here is predominantly heuristic. If the result is to move the reader to
think seriously on the subject matter - to think about thinking and its relation to the
study of law - the major purpose of the piece will be accomplished. All that is presented is
the. view of one law professor of the purpose of law study (at least the first year of law
study) and of some of the ways that purpose might be better accomplished. As such, no
citation to authority has been included. Footnotes have been included only where
desirable to clarify or to comment on points made in the text. Indeed, even such footnotes
have been kept to a minimum in order to avoid the distraction of the reader from the
thread of the article.
Although no supporting authorities are cited, it is appropriate to acknowledge the
contributions to my own thoughts on these matters. The influence of Nathaniel and
Barbara Branden, who first started me thinking about thinking, is obvious throughout.
Appreciation is also due J. Joel Woodey of the University of Maryland School of Law
Faculty for helping me to see the application of the "rules" of good reasoning to legal
education. His identification of the role of doubt in that process, see Woodey, Why Do Law
Professors Bark?, 2 MD. L. FORUM 13 (1972), is valuable insight.
A word of apology to my female colleagues and readers: It is unfortunate that our
language contains no sexually neutral pronoun. I have used the masculine form
throughout to avoid awkwardness of expression; the reader is invited to make the
appropriate substitutions.
** Associate Professor of Law, University of Maryland School of Law. A.B. 1965,
M.A. 1967, Long Island University; J.D. 1970, Rutgers University.
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articulate the means by which the skill is acquired. Rather, they believe
that legal reasoning is a skill to be learned osmotically in all (at least
first year) law courses. They believe that the process is essentially
intuitive or the result of natural talent, and that it can be developed
through exercise (with the law professor as gym instructor) but that it
cannot be explained.
It is the thesis of this article that legal reasoning is nothing more
than reasoning - purposive problem solving - about legal materials,
that there are articulable principles of effective reasoning, and that law
students (and law professors) are better served if made aware of the
nature of those principles. Any chore is likely to be done better if one
knows the principles underlying one's craft. Because most legal tasks
involve problem solving, awareness of the principles underlying the
reasoning process should cause students to become more competent
lawyers.
It is important to make clear at the outset that legal reasoning qua
process is no different from just plain reasoning. There is good reasoning
and there is poor reasoning and there is a great gulf between them; but
there is no separate reasoning process that meaningfully can be
differentiated as "legal reasoning." Legal reasoning, at its best, is
nothing more than or different from good reasoning applied to legal
materials, principally judicial opinions. Given that the process of legal
reasoning is not a separate thought process but is merely a manifesta-
tion of any purposive problem solving, it follows that, at least during the
first year of law study, an important aim of legal education is to teach
the student how to reason well - how to think effectively and
efficiently about problems and their solutions.' Perhaps the "myth" that
there is something special about legal reasoning endures because of this
focus by legal educators on the reasoning process.
As a general rule, people take their thought processes for granted;
they rarely consider the method of their own thinking. As a result most
people think in ways that they learned haphazardly and unconsciously
as children. While the substance of their thought becomes increasingly
more complex, their method of thinking remains undeveloped. We learn
1. Law schools are engaged in the enterprise of teaching people to think efficiently
and effectively about legal problems and legal solutions. This contains two aspects:
reasoning well and applying that method of reasoning to law. While these two are
conceptually separable, they cannot, in fact, be separated in the learning process.
Axiomatically, it is impossible to think without having something to think about; it is
impossible to think well without thinking well about something. In the law school, of
course, the something is law.
1981]
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to speak as children before beginning school. Yet, it is recognized that
speaking properly is something that requires the study of rules of
language and the application of those rules. Similarly, we learn the
mechanical skill of putting words onto paper while recognizing that
effective written communication is a separate skill, the underlying
principles of which can be and should be learned. When it comes to
thinking, however, it is seldom realized that the same process applies:
people rarely attend the principles underlying their thought processes.2
If people do not think about the way they think, it is also the case that
they see no reason to attempt to change the way they think. Their
attention is rarely called to it and they have little occasion to doubt its
efficiency.
The first step in legal education is to raise in the student that
doubt. The law student must be made aware of his method of thinking;
then he must be made to doubt the validity of that method; of thinking;
finally he must be made aware of the necessity of improving it. The
dialogue of the law school classroom permits the student to embark on
this doubting process by forcing him to attend his own thought
processes.3 When legal educators attempt to teach reasoning without
first adverting to its underlying principles, however, the instruction
may prove ineffective and the aim of teaching the skill of reasoning
often may not be achieved. Because the principles underlying the
process of legal reasoning are rarely identified, students may learn to
apply some of the principles of reasoning while remaining largely
unaware of what they are doing. As a result some principles are never
applied and others are applied only sporadically. The student's ability to
reason well may improve, but in what way and to what extent remains
largely fortuitous. If improvement in a student's reasoning ability is to
be more than adventitious, the principles underlying the art and science
2. Perhaps one of the reasons that there is a great deal of awareness of the need for
knowledge in communicative skills, while there is little awareness of this need for skill in
thinking is that what is written or spoken has an existence in reality external to
ourselves. Our thinking, however, has no obvious existence apart from us. Consequently,
one can more easily observe and correct errors in the process of communication than in the
process of thinking. Indeed, the more concrete is the external existent the more likely
people are to observe errors and inefficiencies: editing what is written is easier than
correcting the spoken word; either is more easily accomplished than the correction of
thinking errors.
3. It is unfortunate that this process generally occurs without identification of what
is occurring. The student is anxious and uncomfortable and frequently does not know what
it is the professor is seeking or asking of him. Indeed, it is often the case that the more
successful our students have been as undergraduates the more difficult is their adjustment
to the rigors of law study. They have less reason to doubt their ability to think well, since
their existing method has generally served them well enough thus far in their academic
careers.
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of reasoning first must be identified and then must be applied to the
subject matter, in our case, the law.
The rest of what follows is an attempt to identify some of these
principles. It is, however, still "early in the game"; much remains to be
done. This attempt to adumbrate some of the principles of good
reasoning does not purport to be exhaustive. It is, rather, suggestive and
will, I hope, encourage others to think about thinking and add to what
is here.
The first principle of good reasoning may be termed the rule of
purpose. Before one can think well there must be something about
which to think; the more clearly defined is the subject matter of the
thinking process, the more clear and precise will be the thinking about
that subject matter. Before a problem can be solved, the thinker must
recognize that the problem exists and, further, what the nature of the
problem is. In other words, good reasoning is purposive. The more
clearly a problem is posed, the more manageable it becomes, the less is
one likely to embark on false trails to solution, and the more precise will
be one's thinking about the problem. This rule of purpose, then, can be
stated: Define the problem in the clearest possible terms.4
The application of this principle in legal education, specifically to
case method analysis, should be apparent. Recognition and articulation
of the legal issue for decision is one of the first tasks a law student will
be asked to perform. Typically, the law professor will not move forward
until the issue has been formulated clearly and correctly. If the student
fails to do so in the first instance, questions will be put to him until he
has reached the point of being able to observe his error and has
rethought the case sufficiently to give a clear statement of the issue that
the judge who wrote the opinion was called upon to decide. If the issue is
not specifically defined, the opinion cannot be understood; conversely,
the more clearly stated the issue, the greater the precision and
comprehension of the analysis of the case.
The issue in a case is, of course, the statement of the problem to be
solved; thus, defining the issue is defining the problem. It follows that
the law professor's attempt to impart to his students an issue
orientation to legal materials is nothing more than an application of the
rule of purpose. Moreover, the nature of judicial opinions is such as to
crystalize the importance of this process of issue awareness. The judge
4. I do not mean to suggest here that non-purposive or associational thinking is
valueless; nor do I mean to suggest that serendipity or flashes of insight have not played a
significant role in the identification of new knowledge. The proposition is simply that the
most efficient method of arriving at a solution to a given problem is first to identify what
that problem is.
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writing the opinion is explicating his solution to a specific problem.
That problem is the issue of the case as he sees it. The formulation of
that issue is the first step in its analysis and solution.
While formulation of the issue of a case is the first step in analysis
of the decision of that case, the process to be employed in achieving that
formulation rests on a more basic rule of effective reasoning - perhaps
the most basic and important such rule because it is inherent in all
others: the rule of principle. Good reasoning is based on the formulation
of a principle that controls the perceived facts of the problem. Once a
controlling principle is established, then the merits of the particular
principle and the appropriateness of its application to the facts can be
considered. In other words, good reasoning is principled.
The human mind is such that it can focus on only a limited number
of specifics at any one time. Consequently, if one's thought process does
not rise above the level of the concrete - the level of perception - the
range of one's thought will be, of necessity, severely limited. If, however,
one's thinking process is raised to the conceptual level, its range is
increased immensely. As a very simple illustration: if one is asked to
think "apple" without resort to concepts but only on the level of
concretes, it would be necessary to think of an infinite number of apples,
one, or, at best, a few at a time, until one had thought of every possible
characteristic - shape, size, color, variety, and the like - attributable
to "apple" and every possible combination of these attributes. One's
thinking is much more efficient on the conceptual level: one need only
think "apple." The principle which is easily and quickly focused upon
subsumes the infinite number of concretes that, if they had to be
considered as separate, unrelated entities without reference to the
principle, could never be dealt with.'
If this be true with respect to so simple a concept as "apple,"
imagine the increase in efficiency of thought achieved by the employ-
ment of principles for other far more complex objects of thought.
Obviously, having to deal with every problem without reference to
similar problems already solved is far less efficient than applying the
previously learned solution to a different manifestation of what may be
the same problem, or which may share some of the attributes of the
former problem.
A principle, then, can be defined as a more or less complex
abstraction that subsumes a class of identifiable concretes. Thinking in
terms of the concretes (the peculiar facts) without reference to the
5. For purposes of simplification the notion of concept and the notion of principle are
here being used interchangeably. Such usage, of course, is not strictly accurate. The
distinction, however, does not bear on the validity of the discussion.
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abstraction (the principle) subsuming them violates the rule of princi-
ple; thinking in terms of the abstraction without relating it to the
concretes which it subsumes is equally a violation of the rule of
principle.
In other words, a principle, properly defined, is more than an
undifferentiated generality. An abstraction unrelated to reality - to
facts - is no aid to reasoning. The use of such pseudo-principles
subverts the reasoning process by replacing thought about reality with
thought about labels. Indeed, the employment of such counterfeit
principles may well be coextensive with what appears on superficial
analysis to be its opposite - the ad hoc determination on the basis of
particular facts. A reasoning process based only on concretes or one
based only on undefined abstractions is a poor reasoning process: each
violates the rule of principle.
6
That rule stands as one of the basic notions underlying our legal
system. We recognize the inherent injustice of ad hoc dispute settling
determinations: "A government of laws, not of men." This notion entails
the necessity of rules or principles that are to govern the dispute-
settlement process. Like cases are to be decided in like ways because the
same principle controls the decision. Thus, students are trained to
analyze cases by bringing to the analysis more than their subjective
notions of fairness with regard to the particular facts of a given case or
the particular positions of the parties in that case. Case by case
determinations without reference to principles wider than (though, of
course, inclusive of) the particular facts of any single case are simply
inadequate.
The nature of the judicial opinion facilitates thinking in principles.
Because the court must determine the outcome of a concrete dispute not
only by reference to rules of law wider than the particular concretes of
that dispute but also by application of those rules to the concretes, the
operation of the rule of principle is evident in sharp relief. Similarly, the
student, in analyzing the judicial opinion, must go through much the
6. Frequently, these two superficially opposite errors in thinking occur simul-
taneously. For example, the student who determines that a given plaintiff should prevail
over a given defendant on the basis of a given set of facts without reference to any
governing principle will, often, when pressed to justify his conclusion, attempt to do so by
use of an abstraction such as fairness. When required to relate this abstraction to the facts
relied on in reaching the conclusion such a student may well be unable to do so. His
reliance on either concrete facts or undefined generality disables him from performing
valid analysis to guide the decision, not only in the case before him but in comparable
cases bearing greater or lesser degrees of similarity. This is not to suggest that concepts
such as fairness may never be an appropriate guide to decision; but, rather, that before
they can be so used one must be able to define their content and demonstrate their correct
application to the given set of concretes.
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same process as the judge who wrote it. Focusing on the concretes
without reference to the abstraction or on the abstraction without
reference to the concretes will not yield comprehension of the case. It is
only by thinking in principles that true understanding can be achieved.7
The efficacy of such a thought process, however, is not limited to
so-called legal reasoning; it is the foundation upon which all efficacious
reasoning rests. It is, simply, more easily taught through the legal case
method than otherwise. Efficient problem solving in general requires
thinking in principles for precisely the same reasons that make such
thinking essential for legal problem solving.
In fact, of course, it is impossible for a sane human being not to
think in principles or concepts at all. It is also true, however, that
principled thinking is accomplished to very different extents by
different individuals and by the same individual at different times.
Moreover, the identification and formulation of principles may them-
selves be efficient or inefficient, correct or incorrect. Just as there are
articulable rules of reasoning, there are rules for the identification and
formulation of the principles that are the tools of such reasoning. To the
extent that these rules of principle formation are followed, the
principles formed will have greater validity; and, of course, it is only to
the extent that the principles are valid that they will increase the
effectiveness of the thought process. The case method of legal education
is successful in training minds to formulate principles properly as well
as to think in principles once formulated.
If it is true that principles are the components of the effective
reasoning process, it follows that the process can be no more effective
than the principles that it employs. That is, to reason effectively it is
necessary to formulate correctly and precisely the principles one uses.
Before a principle can be applied it must be identified. Moreover, the
more clearly the principle is understood, the more precisely it is
formulated, the more effective will be the thinking which is dependent
upon it. Essentially, if it is important for a person to know what he is
talking about, it is at least as important that he know what he is
thinking about.
7. There is, quite plainly, an interaction in the typical legal problem between the
operations of the rule of principle and the rule of purpose. The process of establishing the
purpose of the inquiry - the issue of the case - employs the rule of principle. That is, the
issue is rarely stated as whether plaintiff is entitled to relief; rather its correct statement
normally encompasses the appropriate principle of law, on some level of abstraction, in
interrogative form. Its transformation into declarative form on either the same or on some
different level of abstraction is a statement of the principle of law that governs resolution
of the controversy.
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Thus, it is crucial that we seek to establish guidelines for the
correct formulation of principles. Here again the case method is of
especial utility. In determining the principle(s) of law for which a given
case stands, it is necessary to determine the facts upon which the
decision rests. Indeed, one of the most important skills of good legal
analysis is the selection, from the myriad of facts present in any given
case, of those that are relevant, important, or essential to the decision.
Each fact or possible combination of facts must be examined to
determine these characteristics with reference to the particular case.
Those found irrelevant should be discarded. This immediately simplifies
the task of principle formation, if for no other reason than because there
are then fewer concretes to which one must attend. Those facts
considered relevant must then be examined in an effort to determine
their relative importance to the particular decision, and hence to the
formulation of the controlling principle of law. Until one has determined
which facts are necessary to the decision and which are sufficient, the
formulation of the appropriate principle cannot occur.
Typically, a good deal of law school class time is engaged in just this
sort of exercise. Each fact of a given case that a student may have
selected as relevant, important, or crucial in his presentation of the case
is subjected to a searching inquiry to determine the reason(s) for its
inclusion. A similar inquiry often takes place with respect to facts the
student may have elected to exclude as irrelevant or unimportant. As
this process is repeated the student eventually develops this discrimina-
tory skill.
This skill, however, has importance not only in the formulation of
legal principles, but also in the formulation of all principles. Moreover,
this is true for precisely the same reasons that it holds true for
efficacious legal analysis. If, as has been suggested, a principle is an
abstraction that subsumes an infinite number of concretes, those
concretes must have some common characteristic(s) or attribute(s)
which makes them subsumable by the principle. Until those common
attributes are identified, the principle cannot be formulated; to attempt
to formulate a principle without awareness of the concretes that it
subsumes would result in the formulation of an abstraction unrelated to
reality and, therefore, of no aid in the resolution of real problems.
Another skill essential to the proper formulation of principles is
fostered by law school teaching techniques and tools. Often, once a
particular principle of law has been formulated from a single case, the
law professor will suggest several hypothetical fact situations that differ
in one or more respects from the given case. The purpose of these
hypothetical cases, of course, is to determine the outer limits of the
principle, to suggest its refinement or to test its validity.
1981]
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Indeed, even absent the presentation of such hypothetical problems
in class, the student will be called upon to perform a similar mental
process by the structure of most casebooks. It is rare for a law school
casebook to be arranged so as to present only a series of single unrelated
cases with each leading to the formulation of a separate and indepen-
dent legal principle. Virtually every casebook is structured so that a
series of cases are presented that refer, to a greater or lesser extent, to a
single legal principle (whether in the form of a single principal case
followed by note cases, or a series of principal cases, or some
combination of the two). The purpose of so structuring a casebook is the
same as the purpose of the hypothetical cases suggested by the law
professor: to test the principle formulated and to synthesize it with
related principles so that the end product is a well-integrated corpus of
knowledge.
There are times, of course, when two cases are presented that stand
in contradiction to each other. The law student should not be entitled to
assume that this is so, however, until every conceivable effort has been
made to reconcile the two cases by resort to a principle which
comprehends both. It is relatively infrequent that totally irreconcilable
cases are presented. More often two cases which appear to stand for
conflicting principles can be synthesized under a refined principle that
subsumes both.
That this process is part of a student's legal training is obvious. What
is somewhat less obvious is that the same process of synthesis must
occur in every efficient problem-solving activity. Reality is such that
contradictions cannot exist. Consequently, the individual engaged in
problem-solving activity, if he is to check the principles that he has
formulated or the solutions at which he has arrived, must examine the
principle or solution in the light of his past knowledge. If, in so doing,
he arrives at a contradiction he then knows that his thinking has been
faulty, either with respect to the present problem or with respect to
principles at which he has previously arrived. Just as it is true that the
law is a seamless web and that the same basic legal principle may have
application in different doctrinal areas, so it is the case that reality is a
seamless web and that all knowledge must be integrated (or, at least,
capable of integration) without contradiction before its validity can be
assumed. s
In this respect, however, law differs from life. In law, contradictions
can exist; it is possible for different decision-makers to come to opposite
8. Although it is certainly possible to achieve a fully integrated system that is
completely false, it is not possible to achieve entirely correct knowledge in a system
containing contradictions. Thus, while integration cannot assure success, its lack is
symptomatic of failure.
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solutions to the same problem, thereby yielding two contradictory
principles. Nonetheless, the felt need to reconcile apparently conflicting
cases is valuable in building the integrative skill so important to
effective problem solving.
If it is true that good reasoning skills can be developed through
training in law study - and the assumption that it can seems to be at
the base of much of contemporary American legal education - it should
be obvious that these skills would be more quickly and effectively
imparted if law teachers would set out the principles upon which these
skills depend. To suggest that there are such principles and that they
are capable of articulation has been one of the aims of this paper. Quite
plainly, the principles of sound reasoning suggested here are both gross
and incomplete. There are, undoubtedly, many more rules of thinking
that can be discovered and common errors in thinking that can be
identified so that they can be overcome. Much experimental and
theoretical work is needed to analyze the reasoning process through
examination of its components, and to demonstrate the myriad ways
these components can be combined to provide different modes of
thought.
If the idea to which so much lip service is paid - that law schools
teach "legal reasoning" - has any validity, it is incumbent upon
teachers of law to attend far more to this portion of legal education. I
am not suggesting, of course, the abandonment of teachipg doctrine
(that is, the informational component of the law) but rather that efforts
be increased to match action to words with respect to the skills or
reasoning component of law study.9 The first-year curriculum is
referred to as containing the building-block courses of legal education -
Torts, Contracts, Property, etc.. Where are the building blocks of good
reasoning upon which refinements may later be built? Indeed, where is
the reflection of the professed concern for either the basic analytic skills
or their more sophisticated refinements? I submit that time devoted to
the discovery and articulation of the principles of reasoning is time well
spent. Such an investment results in law students becoming better
thinkers and, hence, better lawyers, and in law professors becoming
more effective teachers and, perhaps, more effective in their own
reasoning abilities.
9. It is interesting to note, for example, the number of casebooks organized about the
doctrinal components of the law when compared with the paucity (non-existence) of
casebooks organized around the analytic or reasoning component. Cf. P. BREST, PROCESSES
OF CONSTITUTIONAL DECISIONMAKING (1975).
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